

NASA OSMA Software Assurance Symposium July 18-20, 2006 Technical Briefing



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#### PROBLEM STATEMENT

Autonomous vehicles currently have a limited capacity to diagnose and mitigate failures.

We need to be able to handle a *broader* range of contingencies (anomalous situations).

A contingency is an event or condition (as an emergency) that may but is not certain to occur [Merriam-Webster]





- 1. Speed up diagnosis and mitigation of anomalous situations.
- 2. Automatically handle contingencies, not just failures.
- 3. Enable projects to select a degree of autonomy consistent with their needs and to incrementally introduce more autonomy.

4. Augment on-board fault protection with verified contingency

scripts



SAS\_06\_Contingency\_Lutz\_Patterson-Hine\_Tech\_Briefing





Overview of this year's accomplishments (1)

- Completed Autonomous Rotorcraft Project (UAV) case study
  - Documented process & results (1 published & 2 submitted papers)
  - Performed hardware-in-loop testing of diagnostic tree
  - Project applied results, modifying camera controller to enable autonomous switching between color and video cameras
- Modeled MER Critical Pointing software to be reused on MSL
  - Called if commandability lost & before trajectory-correction maneuvers
  - Auto-generated diagnostic tree from TEAMS model of what is known when a "quit-failed" signal occurs
  - Supplemented available project documentation before reuse





#### Overview of this year's accomplishments (2)

- New case study
  - ADAPT emulates a typical spacecraft power system with redundant power buses, a solar panel, and battery storage
  - The approach for developing contingencies resulted in critical function identification and preliminary identification of required contingency plans
- Described work to date at the Mini-SAS at JPL
- Data availability potentially high (needs packaging, sanitizing of models)
- Technology Readiness Level:
  - FY05: 3 ("Experimental demonstration of critical function &/or proof of concept")
  - FY06: 4 ("Validation in a lab environment") on grounded rotorcraft





#### What is a contingency?

- Contingencies are obstacles to the fulfillment of a system's highlevel requirements that can arise during real-time operations
  - Failures: camera fails due to hardware or software problem
  - Operational situations of concern: lens cap left on means that all images are black, so can't land unassisted
  - Environmental situations of concern: strong crosswind interferes with imaging, thus with finding landing site
- Contingency-handling involves requirements for detecting, identifying and responding to contingencies.
- Contingency handling includes, but extends, traditional fault protection





- Something previously not done automatically is now done by the software
  - Previously done manually, or
  - Previously could not be done
- Example of incremental autonomy:
  - Collision avoidance (not hitting buildings)
  - 1. Remote control by pilot steering from ground
  - 2. Path calculated on ground, loaded into system, path-plan executed in flight
  - 3. Path calculated in flight based on real-time imaging
- Autonomy allows system to detect and respond to a broader class of anomalies in many more ways



## Contingency Software in Autonomous Systems Safety-Critical



- The rotorcraft software is safety-critical:
  - Requires collision-avoidance
  - Requires autonomous take-off & landing in populated areas
  - Used for critical missions: finding lost hikers, downed pilots;
     detecting highway accidents; imaging (early warning) forest fires





#### **Approach**

- 1. Identify contingencies that risk mission-critical functions in a power system testbed (using S-FTA, S-FMECA, Obstacle Analysis)
- 2. Model contingencies & autonomous recovery actions using TEAMS (Testability And Engineering Maintenance System, QSI)
- 3. Analyze contingencies: TEAMS produces diagnostic tree of checks needed to detect & isolate contingency, identifies missing checks and recovery actions
- 4. Code contingencies' diagnosis & recovery behavior in the project's planner scripting language (auto-translation from TEAM's XML output)
- 5. Verify contingency scripts with hardware-in-loop simulation

#### Using the above steps:

- Verify contingency plans used by NASA projects
- Investigate issues in coverage of contingencies
- Test results on power system testbed






#### **Contingency analysis**

- Used Bi-Directional Safety Analysis to find contingencies
  - Forward analysis from potential failures to their effects (Software Failure Modes, Effects & Criticality Analysis)
  - Backward analysis from failures to contributing causes (Software Fault Tree Analysis)
- Guided thinking about possible ways to handle contingencies:
  - Use "Mitigation" column in SFMECA
  - Remove leaf nodes from SFTA graphs
  - Use obstacle resolution patterns [van Lamsweerde & Letier, 2000]
- TEAMS produces a diagnostic tree of checks needed to detect & isolate contingencies; identifies missing checks and recovery action
  - "Testability Engineering and Maintenance System"
  - Modeling & analysis toolset
  - Won NASA Space Act Award
  - Used successfully on 2<sup>nd</sup> generation RLV IVHM risk reduction program SAS\_06\_Contingency\_Lutz\_Patterson-Hine\_Tech\_Briefing





#### Approach







#### **Obstacle analysis approach**

- KAOS framework for goal-oriented obstacle analysis [van Lamsweerde & Letier, 2000]
  - Goal is a set of desired behaviors
  - Obstacle is a set of undesirable behaviors that impede a goal
- Relevance to application:
  - Contingencies are
    - Obstacles to achieving goals, or
    - Indications that goals are unrealizable with available agents
- Advantages
  - Structured approach early-on (anticipatory planning)
  - Supports more formal analysis, as needed





Identifying contingencies & contingency-handling software actions



- Step 1. Identify the goals
- Step 2. Identify the agents
- Step 3. Identify the obstacles to the goals (these are the contingencies)
- Step 4. Identify alternative resolutions to the obstacles (the contingency-handling that can be done autonomously)
- Step 5. Select a resolution among the alternatives




## Contingency Software in Autonomous Systems Other related work



- Requirements evolution
  - Use goal & obstacle analysis to refine requirements in a developing system [Anton & Potts]
- Maintenance
  - Focus on management of requirements changes [Bennett & Rajlich]
  - Evaluate in terms of traceability or change-impact [Cleland-Huang]
- Dynamic monitoring
  - Monitor operational systems for mismatch assumptions/ environment & perform remedial evolutions [Fickas & Feather]
- Autonomous fault handling with AI planners [Brat et al., Chien et al.]
- Safety in autonomous systems [Fox & Das, ESA ESTEC]
- Vehicle health management [Patterson-Hine et al.]




Contingency Software in Autonomous Systems Ames Research Center







Perception instrumentation onboard rotorcraft





## Contingency Software in Autonomous Systems Camera criticality




- Cases in which the cameras are a critical system:
  - Cameras assigned responsibility during nominal ops
    - No line of sight -> Camera provides position info
  - Cameras are backup when other subsystems fail
    - Failed/degraded GPS -> Camera provides position info
    - Failed/degraded ARP -> Camera provides landing-site data
  - Images as mission objective (surveillance)
    - Failure of cameras can jeopardize success
- Thanks to Matt Whalley, Autonomous Rotorcraft Project Manager,
   & to Rob Harris, Chad Frost, Doron Tal, Stacy Nelson, Anupa
   Bajwa






#### **Critical pointing for Mars spacecraft**





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


- •Autonomous, contingency response for critical scenarios such as commandability loss, & before critical trajectory-correction maneuvers
- Thanks to Tracy Neilson, MER/MSL





**Emulates a typical spacecraft power system** 




Thanks to Scott Poll, ADAPT manager






Preliminary identification of some required contingency plans \_\_\_\_\_\_













Properties for each function, switch & test-point are entered into the TEAMS tools

TEAMS builds a Dependency Matrix in which each row is a fault source (e.g., a camera that can fail) and each column is a test (e.g., whether we have a good Stereo image). Here, we select the normal or contingency scenario (camera OK or not) for the analysis.










Executing the Contingency scenario, we check that the behavior is correct: left COLOR camera is available (no red slash) & being used; confirm that tests can isolate failure to which camera.

Most useful: the automatic Diagnostic Tree:

- --Shows best sequence of checks to detect & isolate
- --Shows indistinguishable failures ("ambiguity groups")

```
</LABEL>
<SYMPTOM />
= <NODE LABEL="1"
TYPE="TEST"
ID="T.small_stereo_0.1.2.4.0
" PASS="YES" FAIL="NO">
= <PARA>
- <![CDATA[
```



--XML output option auto- translated into rotorcraft's planning language (APEX) to simulate contingencies on the vehicle





#### **Potential applications**

- Contingency management is essential to the *robust* operation of complex systems such as spacecraft and Unpiloted Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
- Automatic contingency handling allows a faster response to unsafe scenarios with reduced human intervention on lowcost and extended missions
- Results, applied to the Autonomous Rotorcraft Project and Mars Science Lab, pave the way to more resilient autonomous systems



# Contingency Software in Autonomous Systems Next Steps



- ➤Investigate and model with TEAMS key contingencies involved in safe software reconfiguration of power distribution systems to support autonomous operations
- ➤ Demonstrate and verify a subset of the contingency responses we have developed on available platforms
- ➤ Support transfer to other NASA projects





#### Relevance to NASA







**JPL** 

- Improved contingency handling needed to safely relinquish control of unpiloted vehicles to autonomous controllers
- More autonomous contingency handling needed to support extended mission operations